Baron Ungern’s Mongolian Connection
N. Khishigt (Ph.D.)
Associate Professor
Institute of History, Mongolian Academy of Sciences
Just as there are those who, through the honours they achieve and the deeds they perform, exercise a considerable role in the destinies of others, and thus cause their names to be immortalized, any nation or people can likewise inscribe the name of any person in history. Such is the case of Baron von Ungern Sternberg. His name was made familiar around the world through his association with a short yet extremely complex period of Mongolian history at the beginning of the 20th century.
The Chinese military had overthrown the “Autonomous government”, Mongolia’s last hope for independence, and established its own cruel regime; in this situation the Mongolians were searching in every way for a means of escape from their foreign oppressors. Just as Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) representatives S.Danzan and D.Chagdarjav were returning from their mission to Russia with assurances of support from the Soviet government, a division of the Russian White army, pressed back by advances of the opposing Red Army, crossed into Mongolia – thus changing the political situation in that country. These soldiers, entering Mongolia through the Ulz and Onon river basins and Gilber guard-post on the eastern frontier on the second of October 1920, were led by Baron Ungern – one of the founders of the “Pan-Mongolia Movement”, and former accomplice of the Transbaikal Ataman G. Somyonov.
But who was this Baron Ungern, so connected with the political events of Eastern Siberia and with the 1921 Mongolian Revolution, who has been described in various terms for nearly an entire century? Ungern himself explained to A.F. Ossendovski, whom he met at the Mongolian capital of Niislel Khüree in the spring of 1921, that he belonged to the lineage of Ungern von Sternberg, a German whose blood was mixed with that of the Hungarian descendants of Attila the Hun. As recorded by this Polish writer, the ancestors of Ungern had participated in the Crusades, establishing the Teuton nation, possessing conquerors’ palaces in Latvia and Estonia in the 16th and 17th centuries, some of them engaging in piracy, others studying chemistry and conducting various sorts of experiments. Ungern’s grandfather had been a pirate on the Indian sea, collecting tributes from English ships, for which he had been banished to the area of Lake Baikal, close to the border with Mongolia. Thus he was the first of the Sternberg lineage to set foot in the Far East, and his study of the Buddhist faith later had a not insignificant influence on his grandson, Roman Ungern. Yet his father was not particularly renowned among this family of soldiers, pirates and mystics.
Roman Ungern, of the eighteenth generation, was born on the 29th of December 1885 in the Austrian city of Graz. His father’s birth was originally registered according to the Gregorian calendar, but with the change of the calendar when he entered school his birthday was later recorded as January 22, 1886. Furthermore, some publications give Ungern’s year of birth as 1887. Although he was given the name “Robert-Nikolai-Maximilian”, following the tradition common among German families at the time, he did not use the names “Nikolai” or “Maximilian”, and transformed the name “Robert” into “Roman”, and his father’s name “Teodorovich” into “Feodorovich”. Ungern’s mother was a fortuned woman known as Sophie-Charlotte von Vimpfen. Following the separation of his parents in 1891, the son was left with his mother, and thereafter lived with his stepfather Baron Oscar Hoiningen in the town of Rebel` (now known as Tallin – N.K.). Ungern studied for a time at the Rebel` Gymnasium, but was expelled, following which he entered the Petersburg naval academy in 1896. Upon hearing of the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, the first major battle of the 20th century, this man who had dreamed of adventure and honours since a young age decided to go the front, dropping out of school one year early to become an infantry soldier.
But by the time Ungern had reached the Far East the war was long over; therefore he returned to the land of his birth and entered the Pavlov Infantry School. According to General P.N. Vrangel, in 1908 Ungern “just barely passed his officer’s exam” and went off to the military base of Transbaikalian Cossack soldier Argun, situated at Daur Station on the railway between Chita and the Chinese border. There Ungern picked up good riding skills and, setting off on route towards becoming a cavalry officer, gained an indefatigable hardness and patience. Not long after his arrival he was evicted from the Daur base on the grounds of insubordination.
This time, with the help of a paternal relative who worked at the General Military Headquarters and General Rannenkampfl, another relative, he obtained an order to be transferred from Argun’s to the Amar post. Before leaving Daur, Ungern successfully bet the local officers that he could “. . . travel more than 400 versts [approximately 430 km] to Blagoveshchensk [now Khabarovsk – N.K.], where Amar camp was located, only on horseback, eating what could be found along the way”. It is unclear exactly what route Ungern took and what he did on his travels alone through the wilderness on his way to the site of his posting, but later we will discuss the connections with Mongolia suggested by some authors. Arriving at Amar post, the only permanent military outpost of the Cossack soldiers in the Far East, Ungern was first assigned to the machine-gun artillery division, but soon was promoted to the head of the 1st hundredth intelligence division. Yet as there were few opportunities for Ungern, ever in search of adventure and war, to find honours, the bored Ungern obtained a half-year personal leave in 1911 and returned home. Returning to Blagoveshchensk from Revel in 1912, the Manchu Qing empire had collapsed, replaced by the Republic of China; the Mongols, who had once shaken the world under Chinggis Khaan, had re-established an independent state; and moreover a military school had been established in Mongolia in close association with the Imperial Russian trainers: all this struck Ungern’s ears as “especially good news”. Ungern wished to be sent directly to Mongolia, but as he obtained a negative response to his request, he decided to obtain a discharge in order to serve privately, and thus sent a letter requesting a discharge to Petersburg in July 1913. Five months later, when orders for the hundredth captain Ungern to “be given leave without military uniform or stipend” arrived from Petersburg, Ungern had already long departed for Mongolia.
Ungern was living in the town of his birth at the beginning of the First World War in 1914, without money, a family or work; and hoping to discover new opportunities for military glory, he left for the front. Ungern fought on the front lines for a full three years, being injured four times, decorated by the Emperor with the Saint George’s Cross for Bravery, and having earned the Saint Anne’s medal of the third rank, Ungern nevertheless was not promoted above the rank of captain of a 100th division. Around this time he also met Georgii Semyonov, who had a significant influence on Ungern’s future destiny. The alcoholic, crude Ungern was sentenced to punishment for beating the assistant to the city Commander of Ternopol, which occurred on the road to Petersburg, as he was on his way from the Roumanian front to participate in a meeting of recipients of the St. George’s Cross; but his former supervisor, P.N. Vrangel`, saved him with an order for “transfer to a preparatory training division”. With this the glory he was to accomplish on behalf of the Russian Imperial army came to an end, but it can be said that his opportunity to mark his name in history began precisely at this time.
The Russian Revolution of 1917 dealt a heavy blow to Ungern, a dedicated imperialist; and though he was unable to imagine what the future might hold, once again he came out lucky as, by order of General Kornilov, he entered a military division that was passing through Revel in August of the same year, and later arrived in the Transbaikal region. At the time of which we speak, G.M. Semyonov, sent to the Transbaikal region by Kerenskii’s Interim Government, was aiming to establish a “Pan-Mongolian State”, extending across a vast territory from Siberia to Tibet and Northern Manchuria, and put together a “Manchurian special division” made up of volunteers. He appointed his “brave and valiant” acquaintance from the front, who had come of his own accord to seek him out, as Commander of the Khailaar railway station, and shortly thereafter military advisor to the warlord Fushanga [possibly Buyandelger? – N.K.]. In passing, the fact that this Fushanga and the Barga Fushan had, at the “Pan-Mongolia Conference” held at Daur in February 1919, promoted the idea of supporting the struggle to revive the Manchu Qing dynasty, may also have exercised an ideological influence on Ungern. Yet it is important to note that Ungern did not relate at all well to the Pan-Mongolists, who put forward the plan of establishing a western-style state on the foundations of Chinggis Khaan’s Great Empire.
From September 1918 to the beginning of October 1920, the Baron remained at Daur. The most significant event in Ungern’s life at Daur was his marriage on August 16, 1918 to a Manchu princess. As the name and importance, as well as the family background of this scion of the Oriental Empire’s aristocracy were important to Ungern, later historians have concluded that the marriage was consummated primarily for political ambitions. In truth, this was the first and the last time the Baron was to marry, and upon his marriage he returned immediately from Kharbin to Daur; a year later, prior to leaving for Mongolia, he sent a messenger to Baroness Elena Pavlovna (his wife’s Russian name – N.K.) in Harbin to inform her of their divorce in September, 1920, thus bringing one stage of Ungern’s life to a close. Let us now look at the period connected with Mongolia.
A reading of some historical texts would seem to suggest that Baron Ungern visited Mongolia on three separate occasions. The late Academician B. Shirendev wrote that Ungern “served in 1910 as a soldier in the guard of the Russian Imperial Consulate in Khüree”. Although this detail is also cited by other historians, there is no direct reference to it in any primary source. We were also unable to locate any relevant information from archival sources; but simply to look at Ungern’s biography, we can see that the period in question (1910) corresponds to the time at which the Baron travelled from Argun’s post at Daur to his transfer posting at Amar post. One point to keep in mind is that, if we do acknowledge that Ungern fulfilled the bet of Argun’s officers in travelling to his new official posting, he should not have arrived in Mongolia but at his new posting. Although some authors claim that Ungern wandered alone for an entire year throughout Russian Asia and Manchuria, adopting Buddhism and learning Mongolian, there is no evidence connected to this suggestion in other works by or concerning Ungern, including his own diaries and memoirs. This indicates that the likelihood that Ungern actually did come to Mongolia in 1910 is extremely remote, but nevertheless we must not ignore the possibility that further evidence may come to light at a later date.
But in 1913, it is clear from all historical sources that Ungern did visit the town of Khovd at the western frontier of Mongolia, as discussed by numerous historians. Travelling 700 versts from the capital of Mongolia to the town of Uliastai in August 1913, before he met A.V. Burdukov, who was later to write about these travels, Ungern learned from the press about events in China and Mongolia. Thus upon hearing that a Russian military school had opened in Khüree, with Russian trainers, he requested to be sent to Mongolia but his request was denied. Ungern had always perceived Mongolia as “the motherland of great conquerors”, and therefore dreamed of serving as a soldier in Mongolia, even on private terms if necessary; and in July of 1913, claiming that “as a result of difficulties at home it is impossible to continue the Imperial military service”, Ungern submitted a request for discharge from the army. Fearing a repeat of his earlier experience, in which he had been too late to fight in the Japanese war, the Baron did not even wait for a reply to the request he had sent to Petersburg, but instead left directly for Mongolia – though it is unclear precisely how, and by what route he arrived from Amar post. But one can understand that he was a man in a hurry, judging from his speed in reaching the Mongolian border from Amur, pressing onwards across all obstacles between there and Khüree, and racing to Uliastai.
Travelling along a relatively long route, Ungern carried an official paper stating that “Voluntarily discharged Lieutenant Roman Feodorovich Ungern-Sternberg has come to travel westwards in pursuit of valiant deeds, for which cause the present certificate has been provided to him at the military base on the Amar River”. Reaching Uliastai without delay, he continued in a great hurry and travelled a further 450 versts, the distance between 15 örtöö relay stations, in less than three days. A.V. Burdukov described him as a man obsessed with war [or made crazy by war] – “a scrawny, ragged, droopy man; on his face had grown a wispy blond beard; he had faded, blank blue eyes; and he looked about thirty years old. His military uniform was in abnormally poor condition, the trousers being considerably worn and torn at the knees. He carried a sword by his hip and a gun in his belt.” As he raced along his way, shouting at the relay coachman and never feeling fatigue, Ungern interrogated A.V. Burdukov about Dambiijantsan, described how they had fought together against the Chinese, and wrote down Mongolian words in an attempt to learn the language. The Khovd-posted Consul V.F. Lyuba and Colonel Kazakov, in charge of the military headquarters, strictly forbade Ungern from joining forces with the Jaa Lama, as a result of which his hopes to serve in the Mongolian military did not come to fruition. Yet as Ungern himself recorded for posterity, he did not so quickly return home, remaining for approximately half a year in Khovd to learn Chinese and Mongolian, and familiarizing himself with the customs and lifestyle of the Mongols. It is possible that his worship of the Orient and his future ambitions became irrevocably fixed in this period, as the beginning of the actions that would take him back to Mongolia seven years later. He returned home in the winter of the same year, carrying his papers of discharge.
Ungern’s later years were also connected with Mongolia. In the spring of 1920, with the repression of the White Army in Russia and the end of the Civil War, the Red Army freed the Transbaikal region and the Soviet leaders forced Semyonov and Ungern, who were at the Daur Station situated between Chita and the Chinese border, to look for a means of escape from the Red Army. Upon Semyonov’s departure for Manchuria, Baron Ungern left for Mongolia with the stated purpose of reviving the Autonomous regime, destroyed by Chinese General Syui Shujany, who had broken his plans to invade Mongolia directly at the end of 1919.
Disaffected with Western civilization and unable to endure the destruction of Imperial Russia by the recent revolution, Ungern laid his last hopes on Mongolia, believing that “Mongolia must become the main area of support for the revival of the Chinese, Russian and European royal empires”, and “the place where the construction of a new universe will begin”. It is clear that Ungern assumed the political situation and social spirit in Mongolia would provide him with opportunities. Indeed the Mongols, whose Autonomous government, a symbol of independence and the monarchy, had been destroyed, were prepared to ask anyone for help; and for Ungern, staunch believer in monarchy as the best form of social organization, here was a space for him to implement his ideas and political ambitions. Thus he came to Mongolia for a second time. This time, unlike his previous visit, he did not come entirely alone, but led three cavalry divisions of 150-200 men each – Mongol-Buryat, Tatar and Ataman Annenkov divisions – as well as approximately 800 men from the machine-gun cavalry command and three incomplete batteries from Daur; penetrating Mongolia’s frontier he cried out: “We will place the Holy Bogd on the throne, and revive the Autonomous government”, “We will free the Mongols from the Chinese soldiers”, and “We will build the state of Greater Mongolia” and the like; as he tried actively to bring on-side the Mongol princes, who despised the Chinese military, he also sent an emissary carrying a letter to the Bogd. In this missive he requested entry to the capital city, announcing that “I, Baron Ungern, of Russian imperial blood, intend to enter Khüree according to the Mongolian basic custom of friendship, accompanied by soldiers, to provide assistance to the Bogd Khaan, to protect Mongolia and set it free from ruthless Chinese oppression”, offering to “participate actively in reviving the Mongolian Autonomous regime, providing to the Mongolians seven cannons and 4000 vintovs, and expressing our readiness, together with an army made up of the nations formerly subjected to the rule of Chinggis Khaan, to become the subjects of Mongolia”. Upon hearing of the impending arrival of the White Russians, the Chinese military began to take issue against the Mongolian authorities; and under these conditions the Bogd not only accepted the letter from Ungern, but indeed sent a secret official to insist that the Russian soldiers come to Khüree at the greatest speed possible, without turning back on their stated purpose. Moreover it can hardly have been a coincidence that the delegation led by D.Bodoo, following their reception by the Bogd Khaan upon their return from the Soviet Union, immediately went eastwards and joined forces with Ungern’s army. All this could be taken as evidence of their own hidden policy of encouraging the two foreign armies to fight amongst themselves, allowing the Autonomous government to be revived in their midst. It was for this reason that the local authorities not only sent the White Army to the frontier of their country, but also began to provide them with gelding horses, provisions and capital. Thus with the support of Luvsantseveen, taij of the first rank from Darnakh Chin Van’s khoshuu in Tüsheet Khan aimag, meirin Dugarjav, taij Togtokh, Buryat Jambalon and Barga Luvsan, approximately 200 Mongolians were enlisted to join the army. His troops thus reinforced, Ungern left a great number of his soldiers with transport at the Onon River, taking approximately 300 soldiers towards the capital city Khüree, by a route that took them to the north of Bereeven Monastery and past Zaan Terelj. On the 26th of October 1920, Ungern fought his first battle with Chinese soldiers, causing considerable losses; and although he made several attempts to capture Khüree, he remained unsuccessful.
As a result of the White Russians’ attempts to take Niislel Khüree, the Chinese military leaders began to put increasing pressure on the Mongolian authorities, headed by the Bogd Khaan; and Mongolians took flight from the plundering and pillaging of the Chinese soldiers, leaving Khüree for Sögnögör, Terelj and other nearby mountains. The telephone line between Khüree and Khiagt was cut, and trade came to a standstill. Conditions in Khüree became disorderly; the mixed forces of 4200 men led by Go Siling and approximately 1100 cavalrymen occupied Khüree alone, while the remainder stayed in Choir and Zamyn-Üüd to the south. In addition, a further thousand-odd soldiers were brought in from Khaalga, 3000 Chinese men were enlisted into the army, and the border guard was reinforced. But although the Chinese soldiers were capable of cruelty they were not capable of holding Khüree by their military force alone. But to judge from the size of Ungern’s army before he fought to take Khüree – his force of 2000 Russians having been augmented by approximately 1000 Mongolians, constituting a force of 3000 soldiers, made up of four divisions of 400 men each, the Trans-Baikal Cossack army, an “Asian division” made up exclusively of officers and Japanese trainers, and the Buriat division headed by Tapkhayev, equipped with 3 cannons and 50 machine guns.
Preparations for taking the Mongolian capital were made hastily, and laying on his forces, Ungern successfully captured Niislel Khüree on February 4, 1921. Ungern immediately established an Interim Government, made up of Luvsantseveen as military General, J.Jambalon as Deputy General, Erenchinsambuu as Military Lama, and Deren Choijin, with himself as General Commander. From the battle for Khüree, the Whites salvaged more than 4000 guns and weapons of various descriptions, a large quantity of foodstuffs, clothing, and the Chinese military coffers, containing nearly nine million dollars. Although it is clear that the administration, fighting ability and poor motivation of the Chinese soldiers had an impact on their ability to hold Khüree, it is important to note the central role of the heroic struggle carried out by the Mongols against the Chinese gemin, under the general leadership of Ungern, for the sake of their nation and the Bogd.
On February 21, 1921 Ungern invested the Holy Bogd as khan, or king of Mongolia, and established five ministries. Jalkhanz khutagt Damdinbazar was appointed Prime Minister (“Minister for General Government Decisions”) and Minister of the Interior, Shanzudba Dashzeveg as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bishrelt Van Dorjtseren as Minister of Defense, Luvsantseveen as Minister of Finance, Beis Chimiddorj as Minister of Justice, and Khatanbaatar Magsarjav as General Commander of the Armed Forces. At the beginning of March, Baron Ungern again fought the Chinese military as it attempted to recover Khüree, a battle that was won after three days; and later he personally directed his troops in the battles of Choir and Khaalga. Approximately 1200 Mongolian soldiers, under the leadership of Baljinnyam beis and Sundui gün completely destroyed their Chinese opponents at the battle of Ulaan Khad, causing considerable damage; the final battle between the gamin and the White Russians took place near Choir towards the end of March. The Chinese lost approximately 4000 men, and their leaders fled across the border. The Bogd bestowed the title of “Khoshoi Chin Van” on Ungern, recognizing also the accomplishments of his followers.
At the time of the southern battles, although Baron Ungern’s men reached the Chinese border they did not continue as far as Beijing, returning to Khüree to undertake “stabilizing” activities – possibly connected with Ungern’s view that his entry into Mongolia was “something of worldwide importance”. With his now abundant reserves of artillery and capital, Ungern was able to take some measures to strengthen his influence and to bolster his army’s military capacities. Above all, he made attempts to obtain recognition of the Bogd’s government by other nations; and in an effort to stabilize national finances he established a bank and supplied 250,000 dollars’ worth of short-term “betting money”. Having opened a textile (sewing) plant and a repair centre, he revived and re-opened the mine at Nalaikh.
But by this time slaughter and massacre had become daily activities of the White Army, whose victims came to comprise not only Jews and Bolshevik Russians but even Mongolians. There are several irrefutable cases of evidence of cruel and loathsome deeds conducted by the White Russians. “One wished to avert one’s gaze from the hangings, all over the place, of the poor, lamas, men and women, old and young, even children”, and as a result eyewitnesses described this time as “the bloodbath of Örgöö”. The farther they went from Niislel Khüree the more the White Russians turned into a gang of bandits, destroying pasture and livestock watering areas, and stealing from trade caravans. With the establishment of Ungern’s rule some groups of White Russians gathered at the Mongolian frontiers, and people like Kaigorodov, Kazantsev and Kazagrandi, who were living in exile in Altai, Khovd, Khatgal or Daichin Vangiin Khüree, rose up and began robbing the general population throughout the country. Military divisions led by Andrei Shubin, Tuvanov and Ochirov set up respectively near Khövsgöl Lake, and in the basins of the Kherlen and Onon rivers, adding a further 2300-2500 White Russians attempting to join Ungern’s administration and forces. On April 14, 1921, Ungern issued a decree enlisting all Buryats between the ages of 19 and 45 into his army, under threat of harsh exile.
An even greater danger was that the Mongolian authorities, under the influence of the time and current events, struggled on Ungern’s behalf and conscripted soldiers from the aimags and khoshuun. The Bogd decreed that one thousand men should be conscripted from each of the Tüsheet Khan, Tsetsen Khan and Shav` districts, appointing Khatanbaatar S. Magsarjav as general commander of the military units from the two western provinces, and gün L.Gombo-Idshing as commander of the eastern forces. Ungern also sent repeated invitations to the Jaa Lama, but not only did the latter refuse to come, but also took affront at the perceived conspiracy between the Khüree leaders and the Baron. Ungern, threatening pressure, cunning and force, was able to expand his army by enlisting more Mongolians; and the Mongols who had followed the Bogd’s decree or who had been deceived into enlisting, fought eagerly on behalf of their nation for a time. Until the middle of 1921 there were approximately 4000 Mongolian soldiers under Ungern’s general command, led by Luvsantseveen Tergüün, Sundui Gün, Baljinnyam Gün, Bayar Gün, Beis Dugarjav, Naidan Van, Dari Ekh Lama, and court official Geleg-Yondon; recent studies have shown that approximately 2/3 of these troops were actually Mongols. Although Ungern played a definite role in evicting the Chinese soldiers, his further plans and actions, and in particular his policy of drawing the Mongolians towards himself were extremely troublesome. Ungern truly brought misery to Mongolia, which had already suffered for a full two years in the hands of robbing and pillaging Chinese soldiers, with his own military regime and intimidation.
The Mongolians very rapidly came to understand Ungern’s true face. Disagreements emerged between Ungern and the Bogd, head of both church and state, with the Bogd becoming increasingly wary of Ungern’s activities. The state authorities were not merely obedient servants either. In addition, the Mongols in the south of the country had staged a revolt for the sake of freedom and independence; the Chinese soldiers who had been defeated by Ungern had been chased out of Khiagt; and a National Revolutionary Interim Government had been established, with preparations underway to undertake a struggle to liberate the whole country. As a result, Mongolians treated Ungern less as a “liberating saviour” than as one from whom they wished to distance themselves. They showed that the Mongols would not share the same path as him in the future, and Ungern himself understood that his own position had become less than stable. In general it is difficult to define, in a single word, how influential Ungern was in Mongolia; it would probably be best to approach the question by dividing his influence according to different periods. Although he enjoyed a strong position and influence the first month, it would not be possible to apply this same description for the period thereafter. For example, in his own later testimony to an interrogator, Ungern stated “I tried to stay out of Mongolian affairs, but my soldiers were Mongolian so it became necessary to become involved”; but subsequently he claimed that he “had no political influence”. There was no need for Ungern, with no strength to go on, to stay in Mongolia.
Thus he decided to direct his efforts elsewhere, and sent a letter on May 20, 1921 to Gregory, the Beijing Agent, in which he wrote “. . . in the near future I personally will begin to take military action against the Bolsheviks. After we have provided all military stations that aspire to fight Communism with an impetus to decision, a rebellion will begin in Russia; and once we have placed honest and faithful people at its head, I will transfer my activities to Mongolia, attempting to revive the Qing Empire. . .” From this it would appear that Ungern had begun his fight against Bolshevism; but in reality it is more likely that he was devoting equal efforts to salvaging his reputation in Mongolia, which was worsening day by day. Therefore he sent his “Decree No. 15” to all White Army unit headquarters in Soviet Siberia, inviting them to join forces, and on May 21, 1921 he set off northwards. But Bayar Gün’s unit, which had come to the head of the Whites, was defeated at Altanbulag by General D.Sükhbaatar’s People’s Army, Dari Ekh Lama’s soldiers also surrendered, and in the middle of June the remaining forces personally commanded by Ungern in the border region were defeated by Mongol-Russian forces and dispersed. Although Ungern attempted on several occasions to penetrate the USSR to the north, in the direction of Vangiin Khüree, he remained unsuccessful and on August 14, 1921 he returned to Mongolia. Thereafter the White Army – having given in to continuous plotting and disorder – began to weaken, and the Baron’s close assistant General Rezukhin was killed, leaving from the Mongolian side only Sundui Gün’s division. Ungern took his remaining 500-odd soldiers to Khalkhanzyn Khüree, but a plot against him emerged at this time, and narrowly escaping the White soldiers’ bullets, Ungern joined up with Sundui Gün’s Mongolian soldiers. But his destiny had already been decided.
On August 22, 1921 Sundui Gün and his own soldiers Demid and Luvsan-Ochir captured Ungern in a trap set at a place known as Gangyn Üzüür, situated at the opening of Jargalantyn Am along the first tributary of the Zülegt River, to the west of Tarialan soum in Khövsgöl aimag, and later surrendered him to K.K. Rokossovskii’s 35th division. The story of how the Baron was captured and turned over, and how the Red Army soldiers at first did not recognize him has been described in many different ways, but in any case Ungern was taken prisoner and his activities in Mongolia came to an end. The captive Ungern was brought to the Mobile Interrogation Unit at Troitskosavsk, then was brought by way of Deed-Üde and Irkutsk to Novonikolaevsk where his trial was held. On September 15, 1921 the Special Revolutionary Military Court of the USSR sentenced General R.F. Ungern von Sternberg, commander of the Asian cavalry division, to be executed, and the sentence was carried out the same day. During his public trial in the Sosnovka Gardens Theatre in Novonikolayevsk, Ungern was wearing a tattered yellow deel and Mongolian boots; later, when news of his execution reached Khüree, it is said that the Bogd Khaan ordered that prayers be chanted throughout the town on Ungern’s behalf. This was the final example of Ungern’s living connection with Mongolia.
Alongside the names of generals M.V. Alekseyev, P.N.Brangel`, A.V.Denikin, A.I. Dragomirov and L.G. Kornilov, and Admiral A.V. Kolchak, who continued to lead the White movement – which encompassed half a million people – for a further two years after 1920, we do not find the name of Ungern von Sternberg, the man who never rose higher than captain of the 100th division when serving the Russian army. But this is proven by the events in Mongolia that immortalized his name.
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